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MEMORANDUM REPORT

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS, AND KEY PERSONNEL OF THE  
SOVIET CONTROL COMMISSION (SCC) IN EAST GERMANY, THE MAIN  
ADMINISTRATION OF SOVIET PROPERTY ABROAD (CUSTIMZ) AND THE  
ADMINISTRATION FOR SOVIET PROPERTY IN GERMANY (USIG)

CIA/RR IP-309  
and  
IP-311

Note

The information and data contained herein do not necessarily represent the final position of ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and subject to revision. Additional data or comments which may be available to the user are solicited.

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Organizational Structure, Functions, and Key Personnel of the  
Soviet Control Commission (SCC) in East Germany, the Main  
Administration of Soviet Property Abroad (GUSIMZ) and the  
Administration for Soviet Property in Germany (USIG)

I. Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this memorandum is to present in summary form the results of a study made of the organizational structure, functions, and chain of command, including identification of key personnel, of the three Soviet control agencies known as the Soviet Control Commission (SCC), the Main Administration of Soviet Property Abroad (GUSIMZ), and the Administration for Soviet Property in Germany (USIG). All of these agencies were established as administrative organs to safeguard what the Soviet Union regarded as its interests in East Germany. The SCC and the USIG were confined exclusively to the Soviet Zone of Germany while GUSIMZ was responsible also for the administration of Soviet property acquired in other countries, such as Hungary, Austria, and Finland.

This memorandum combines two requester requirements, one dealing with the SCC and the other covering the two remaining agencies. The separation of these requirements into two parts resulted in setting up separate projects (OPR IP-309 and IP-311). The close interrelationships of all three agencies, however, prompted their being treated in a single memorandum.

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The limitations of time set by the requirements precluded an adequate evaluation and interpretation of the source material. This study, therefore, represents largely an exploratory effort of limited scope which may be expanded at a later date should requester requirements make it desirable to do so.

The three Soviet agencies appear to be so unique and unusual in the ordinary administration of civil affairs in an occupied country that it seemed desirable, in spite of the narrow scope, to include a very brief statement of background information (Section II). Without such explanation the later sections of the report might be confusing because the need for such elaborate administrative devices might not be apparent.

Excluded from this study is any evaluation or appraisal of the strengths or weaknesses of these agencies.

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
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## II. Soviet Occupation of East Germany

Although four major powers participated in the occupation of Germany, the control agencies established by the Soviet Union were unique and unusual. Before attempting to describe these agencies, the following brief commentary is submitted as background information to assist in understanding the explanations which appear in Sections III and IV.

### A. Military Administration

The occupation of the Soviet Zone of Germany ~~shown in the accompanying map~~ (Figure 1) began 9 June 1945 by the appointment of Marshal Zhukov as Supreme Commander and Military Governor of the Soviet Military Administration (SMA). By 9 July plans for the administration of the Laender in the Soviet Zone were completed and put into effect by proclamation No. 5 of the same date. This proclamation announced the appointment of five Colonel Generals as heads of the military government teams in the five provinces or Laender. These SMA teams were small editions of SMA headquarters in Berlin. However, the Soviet practice of centralization of administration was reversed in that orders from Moscow were sent directly to the Laender SMAs without going through the normal channels of command. Confusion naturally resulted since the chief of a mission, particularly those concerned with reparations, dismantling, or investigations, acted on their own <sup>interpretation of</sup> ~~initial~~ directives ~~to~~ without proper coordination. It was not until the middle of



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1946 that some semblance of order was established. This Soviet inconsistency of demanding on the one hand a clear-cut chain of responsibility from the German administration while on the other hand issuing directives from Moscow rather than through the normal channels of command, was typical of the Soviet occupation.

In addition to representing the Soviets on the Four-Power Committees, the SMA headquarters conceived its task to be the supervision of German authorities in carrying out Soviet plans. Directives as to methods were frequently issued to which were often attached injunctions to specific individuals regarding matters of great detail. Soviet planning followed the USSR model and, consequently, more emphasis was given to planning than to the implementation of plans. The difference between planning and execution greatly reduced the independence of the German administrative bodies. But, in this way, the Russians managed to avoid losing themselves in the intricacies of the unfamiliar Germany economy.

**B. Occupation Objectives**

The declaration of the Soviet Foreign Minister of 9 July 1946 gave three reasons why Soviet troops were in Germany. These were:

1. To insure military and economic disarmament.
2. To insure the establishment of a "democratic" regime.
3. To insure reparation deliveries.

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The Politbureau in Moscow had formulated a precise policy regarding reparations. Their basic objectives envisioned two kinds of reparations from Germany, as follows:

1. A part of Germany property to be withdrawn from the economy and shipped to the USSR.
2. The delivery of certain quantities of goods out of current production for a period of ten years.

### C. Reparation Policies

Outside of a handful of Russians in Germany and perhaps one or two Germans, no one was permitted to have a complete picture of the extent of reparations received from Germany. All economic statistics were treated as secrets and reparation statistics were top secret. On the Soviet side there was not a single agency, but many agencies, dealing with all forms of reparations. Some of the agencies were controlled directly by the Office of the Five-Year Plan, others by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, others by the Ministry of the Interior, and others by the Armed Services. The SMA had no control over the collection and delivery of reparations. Such division of responsibility resulted in creating competition between the different agencies handling reparation goods. Soviet dismantling teams, for example, would arrive in East Germany and make clear to the SMA that the latter had no power over them. In this administrative confusion much of the dismantling was carried out.

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The Soviets were aware that their reparation policy was in disagreement with that followed by the Western allies and that this policy would tend to nullify all their other actions in Germany which might be interpreted in a favorable light. Nevertheless, they intended to carry out this policy at all costs. It was for this reason that the question of reparations was kept so completely out of German hands and entirely separated from other administrative actions taken in the Soviet Zone. This separation existed even in the ideological sphere. A genuinely Communist policy in Eastern Germany would have been in such glaring contrast to the facts of reparation payments that it would have been discredited. It was considered best, therefore, to drop the pursuit of Communism rather than the pursuit of reparations. In the initial period from May 1945 to May 1946, the Soviets hoped that the Germans would build up a <sup>favorable</sup> picture of the USSR, collecting only reparation payments to which they were entitled on the one hand, and on the other of attempting to lighten the load of the people by a series of progressive measures. A measure of political liberty was offered in return for economic exploitation. But after April 1946 the pretense was dropped in order to insure the security of the occupation while permitting reparations to flow unhampered to the USSR. By the summer of 1947 it was clear that Communism in Germany would have to be based on Russian power and could never have sufficient strength

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through popular support to enable it to stand on its own feet.

The difference between Soviet attitudes toward East Germany and the other Communist states of Eastern Europe was largely a <sup>matter of reparations.</sup> ~~difference in objectives.~~ In the latter countries Soviet demand for goods and services was never the main objective of USSR control. In all these countries the strength of the local Communist government arose out of Communist control of the underground movement fighting the Germans during the war. The step from there to control of the state was easy in the confused situation following the defeat of the Germans. In Germany, however, reparations formed the basis of Soviet occupation policies and all other measures were subordinated to it. The German Communists were treated as members of a defeated nation and their power came not from their own efforts, but by support from the occupying Army. As long as reparations remained the chief object of Soviet policy, the Communists in Eastern Germany were merely the collection agents for insuring continued payments.

### III. Soviet-Owned Enterprises

In addition to the dismantling of plants and the delivery of production extracted from the Germany economy, the Soviets demanded the outright expropriation of plants. The transfer of some of the biggest and most important plants to Soviet ownership and management was effected through SMA orders No. 124 and No. 125 dated December 1946. In theory these properties were "saved"

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from dismantling in order to provide employment for the German labor force. Presumably these plants belonged to the former German state, the Nazi Party, or to illegal organizations. This legal fiction did away with the necessity for compensation. In all, the Soviets acquired some 220 enterprises known as State-Owned or Soviet-Owned companies or enterprises (Staatliche or Sowjetische Aktiengesellschaften-SAGs).

These plants were registered in Germany as public companies of limited liability owned by the Soviet Union. At first each factory was held as a separate unit with the Soviet manager and chief engineer, as well as unrevealed persons in the USSR, cited as the principal shareholders. In 1947 these factories were organized into groups according to the type of industry (see Appendix C). The ownership of the shares was transferred later to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Trade or to some of the Soviet trading companies, bringing the SAGs more in line with the industrial trust system of the Soviet Union.

The operation of the SAG plants was taken entirely out of German control. Around these industrial concerns developed a whole series of Soviet ancillary organizations including a Soviet transport firm, a Soviet bank, and two Soviet export-import firms. Thus, within the Soviet controlled economy of East Germany, there developed an exclusively Russian economy. The effect on the German economy was great because the raw material requirements

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were taken from German supplies. The manufactured products were shipped to the USSR as Soviet-owned, <sup>although</sup> ~~and were not~~ credited as reparation payments. Products rejected because of inferior quality were sold back to German consumers if they were too poor to be acceptable in foreign markets. In no sense had the Germans any claim to SAG production.

### IV. Soviet Control Agencies

The establishment of Soviet control over and the exploitation of the East German economy was a developing process rather than the imposition of a ready-made and full-grown administrative organization. Between July and October 1945, twelve Central Administrations were set up in Berlin to help the SMA coordinate the work of revitalizing the economy. These, naturally, were patterned after the Soviet model and followed rather closely the industrial organization of industry in the USSR at the ministerial level. Thus, there was established the German Central Administration with two main divisions, one for economic affairs and the other for all other activities. Within the economic group there were the following subgroups of the Central Administration:

#### Industry

Basic Industry

Heavy Industry

Light Industry

Fuel and Power

Trade and Supply

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Agriculture and Forestry

Transport

Finance

Statistics

Labor and Social Affairs

Posts and Telegraphs


Soviet emphasis upon reparations in one form or another has previously been stressed. Consequently, it was to be expected that the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade would have an interest in the shipment of goods to the USSR from East Germany. Similarly, the industrial ministries in Moscow were <sup>interested in</sup> ~~concerned with~~ the progress of industrial production of their specific industries. Many of the SMA technicians sent to the Soviet Zone were recruited from the Soviet ministries to insure as large a trained group as possible.

With the establishment of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in October 1949, the SMA announced a policy of granting greater administrative responsibility to the Germans. Consequently, the SCC was formed in November 1949 to take over the SMA responsibility for economic affairs. The SCC limited itself to control and supervision rather than to direct operations indulged in by the SMA. <sup>the formation of</sup> With <sup>the formation of</sup> this agency the formal over-all organizational structure and chain of command <sup>appeared.</sup> ~~was established~~ as shown in the accompanying chart (Figure 2).

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Figure 2. Formal Chain of Command of Soviet Control Agencies in East Germany \*



— Executive control  
 - - - - - Advisory and liaison  
 . . . . . Supplementary control channels

\* Formal chain of command is not always followed, see text.

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A. Soviet Control Commission (SCC)

The SCC was a smaller body than the SMA. Its total personnel strength as of 1 May 1950 was estimated at 10,000 of which 1,000 were at headquarters in Karlshorst-Berlin and 9,000 at headquarters in the five Laender.

1. Organization

The organization of the SCC is shown in the accompanying chart (Figure 3). There is nothing unusual in this structure since it conforms to Soviet patterns and procedures. In the latest available information there were indications that the major work of the SCC had been grouped under two main administrations, one for economic affairs and the other for civil affairs. The remaining subdivisions were known as divisions rather than main administrations. Whether there have been additional regroupings recently to conform with the changes made in the East German government is not known. However, the functions of the subordinate units would remain the same regardless of grouping.

It may be commented, however, that there seems to be some evidence that the Foreign Trade Division is not exclusively responsible to the chairman SCC but that the Soviet Diplomatic Mission in Berlin may have liaison channels to this unit because of its interest in cover firms. Also, Semenov, one of the political advisers with the rank of Ambassador, seems to have greater influence

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than is indicated on the organization chart. It is rumored that Semenov acts on orders direct from Vyshinsky in Moscow. He is also reported to represent the MGB.

### 2. Functions


When SCC was set up, General Chuikov announced that the GDR ministers would assume responsibility for their sectors of the East German economy and that SCC would confine itself to the prevention of measures contradictory to Four-Power agreements and to the interests of the USSR. The SCC, however, maintains the same tight control over the East German economy as did its predecessor agency. No written agreements exist defining the relationships between the SCC and the GDR. The Soviets are the sole judge of actions taken by the GDR. They can intervene immediately and effectively, and they do so. Thus, various units of the SCC maintain direct contact with their corresponding GDR units without going through channels. As is characteristic of Soviet procedure, they demand detailed reports by the GDR administrators but, in turn, give directives and orders verbally.

### 3. Personnel

The assignment of key Soviet personnel to the SCC is shown in the chart (Figure 3). The complete listing of Soviet personnel as to the latest period available is given in Appendix A.

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Figure 3. Formal Chain of Command of Soviet Control Commission in East Germany (SCC)



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B. Main Administration for Soviet Property Abroad (GUSIMZ)

1. Organization

Headquarters of the GUSIMZ organization is reported as Kuibisheff Street, Moscow. This main administration was originally set up as a department in the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In 1946 the point of view of Mikoyan apparently prevailed and GUSIMZ was taken out of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and established as a new main administration attached to the USSR Council of Ministers. The organizational structure, as reported in 1948, is shown in the accompanying chart (Figure 4). It is anticipated that this structure has been expanded since the date of the report and that the subordinate units, shown as KAPEL and United Soviet State Corporation of Precision Machines, may no longer exist as separate units. Reference to the SAC administrative groups (Appendix C) would indicate the apparent close relationship between the latter agency and ONTOWELO.

2. Functions


The functions of GUSIMZ is reported as follows:

1. Planning, production, financing, and delivery of products by foreign departments.
2. Checking fulfillment of planned production.
3. Settling of financial accounts.
4. Establishment of proper statistical records and rendering of reports to higher echelons.

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Figure b. Preliminary Organisation of Main Administration for Soviet Property Affairs (GUSMZ)\*



\* Also known as Main Administration of the First Administration in Moscow

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This agency appears to be more of a top management organ than a policy determination agency. However, with Soviet emphasis upon planning, GUSIMZ still functions as a planning agency to implement USSR policy approved by the Soviet Council of Ministers. It may also assist in the implementation of policy by one or more of the various industrial ministers. Although a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers, GUSIMZ appears to be responsible more for service than for the formulation of policy.

### 3. Personnel


Soviet key personnel assigned to GUSIMZ are shown directly on the organization chart (Figure 4). Although the source from which this information was taken did not indicate Skopzov's responsibility, it was assumed that <sup>planning</sup> ~~this~~ might be his specialty because of the importance ascribed to the planning function in the Soviet Union.

## C. Administration for Soviet Property (USIG)

### 1. Organization

This agency represents the arm of GUSIMZ responsible for the operation of the SAGs in East Germany. Its headquarters are located in the Ascania Building, formerly occupied by the Luftwaffe, on Berlin Allee 107-110, Berlin-Weissensee. The probable organization of this agency is shown on the accompanying chart (Figure 5). The occasion for doubt centers in the fact that defector reports vary greatly in detail although generally the reported functional structure are quite similar.

Figure 5- Probable Chain of Command of Administration for Soviet Property in Germany (USIG)



\* German civilian

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### 2. Functions

The functions of USIG may be summarized as follows:

Section I. Over-all Soviet planning for production and distribution. This section operates under direct orders from Moscow and apparently is closely guarded by MVD guards.

Section II. Handles contracts, large scale purchases, financial matters, and price control. It examines all cost calculations and sends reports to the Ministry of Finance in Moscow.

Section III. Approves all sales except large scale projects initiated under trade treaties which are controlled from Moscow.

It is apparent that one of the major problems confronting the SACs deals with the procurement of raw materials. For this reason the SACs from the beginning have had a privileged position in the allocation of raw materials, fuel, and labor. But in spite of enjoying top priority, black market purchases are frequently resorted to in order to procure scarce materials. These operations are apparently the responsibility of the Procurement Department in Section II. The normal problems of supply apparently fall under the purview of the Supply Department of Section I. The allocation of SAC orders is apparently handled directly from Moscow through GOSIMZ. Consequently, the Sales Department of Section III assumes the responsibility for storage and the sale of goods not regularly marketable. This department is apparently

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a German office attached to USIG.

3. Personnel

Soviet personnel assigned to USIG is submitted in

Appendix B.

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V. The Karlshorst Compound

A. Location

Most of the top Soviet administrative control agencies are centered in Karlshorst, Berlin (Figure 6). The area taken over and formed into what is known as the Karlshorst Compound is roughly that included by Treskow Allee, Stolzenfels Street, Loreley Street, including the former German Pionierkasernen Complex, and Rosmerweg (Figure 7). The main entrance is located at Koepenicker Allee about 100 meters southeast of its intersection with Waldow Allee.

With the exception of the SAG administrative office, which is located on Berlin Allee 107-110, Berlin-Weissensee (Section IV C and Appendix C), the main administrative office for not only East Germany but apparently for what may be regarded as the most important Soviet outpost in East Europe, is located in the closely guarded Karlshorst Compound. Quarters for top Soviet administrators are also located here.

B. Organization

1. Section I

The Karlshorst Compound is divided into three administrative sections (Figure 7). In Section I, comprising the most southern portion of the compound, is located the Interrogation Center of the Security Police, the Post and Telegraph Office, the Soviet-sponsored newspaper, Taegliche Rundschau, and quarters for visiting VIPs.

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Figure 6

(Map of Berlin)

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2. Section II

In this sector is located KETCH, the Soviet construction service, as well as the Soviet Foreign Trade Department, the Dispensary and other housekeeping units, and private residences for Soviet personnel. However, the building located at the intersection of Marksburg Allee and Waldow Allee is under permanent heavy guard. Germans in possession of the regular compound passes cannot enter this area without special authorization. The same heavy security applies to the building at No. 2 Weseler Street between Popparder and Godesberg Streets. The occasion for this heavy guard is unknown.

3. Section III

In this sector is located the main administrative offices of the SMA, the SCC, General Chaikov's office and that of his chiefs of staff, the Soviet Security Police, the Soviet Finance Office, as well as other miscellaneous administrative units.

Immediately outside of the compound are housed the German Volkspolizei and the SSD. Between the compound and the race course, about 500 meters to the south, are stationed the Guard Battalion Berlin.

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Soviet Personnel Assigned to the Soviet Control Commission of East Germany

<u>Name</u>	<u>Assignment</u>
Aleksandrov (fnu)	Chief of Heavy Industry Section
Antonov, Col.	Post Officer
Astkov (fnu)	Reparations Dept.
Bakulin, I. S.	Deputy Political Adviser to SCC Chairman
Barinov (fnu)	Former Chief of Reparations Dept.
Belikov (fnu)	Chief of Metallurgy Section
Bobovich, Johanna	Reparations Dept.
Borsov, General A. M.	Chief of Health Dept.
Butkov (fnu)	Former Chief of Finance Div.
Bykov, G. S.	Chief, Economic Planning Dept.
Chekhakov (fnu)	Information Bureau
Chaikov, General V. I.	Chairman SCC
Drofa (fnu)	Chief of Commerce and Supply Dept.
Gatkarskaya (fnu)	Head of Ear, Nose and Throat Dept. Public Health
Hmalevsky (fnu)	Deputy Chief of Economic Planning
Ivanova (fnu)	Cashier, Information Bureau
Kabanov, Col. General A. F.	Chief, Civil Affairs Administration
Khomvakov, S. A.	Chief, Economics Dept.
Kiyatkin, M. M.	Chief of Information Bureau
Kosirok (fnu)	Chief Receptionist, Information Bureau

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Krutkow (fnu)	Reparations Dept.
Kvatkovskaya, Mrs.	Secy. Information Bureau
Lastochkina (fnu)	Secy. Information Bureau
Lebedeva, Mrs.	Secy. Information Bureau
Linka, Lt. Col. P. S.	Former Acting Chief, Administration
Lulko (fnu)	Information Bureau
Melnikov, M. I.	Chief, Office of Reparations
Metukhin (fnu)	Chief of Internal Trade Dept.
Nagivaikov, V. Y.	Chief, Visa Section (Diplomatic Mission)
Nikiforov (fnu)	Representative from USSR Ministry of Metallurgical Industry
Ostrovski, Col.	In charge of Russian Nursery School
Paleyev, Georgey Anatolievich	Former Chief of Heavy Industry Section
Parshin (fnu)	Chief Accounting Section of Information Bureau
Perelivchenko, M. I.	1st Deputy and Chairman for Economic Administration
Priogov, N. A.	Protocol and Liaison
Polupov (fnu)	Protocol and Liaison
Razgulyaev (fnu)	Chief Librarian, Information Bureau
Sagayev (fnu)	Chief of Coal Dept.
Semishastnov, I. P.	Deputy Chief, SCC
Shaiton, A. A.	Chief, Protocol and Liaison
Sklyaeva (fnu)	Secy. Information Bureau
Shamilin, Lt. Col. A. A.	Former Chief of Commerce & Supply Dept.

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Simochik (fnu)	Representative of USSR Ministry of Fisheries
Sitnin, V. K.	Former Chief of Finance Div.
Starostin, S. I.	Economic Planning Section
Strelnikov (fnu)	Chief of Economics Dept.
Stroganov, M. V.	Deputy to SCC Representative in Berlin
Susin, A. F.	Deputy to SCC Representative in Berlin
Titov, F. D.	Chief, Legal Dept.
Vakupov, Abdul	Legal Dept.
Vershinin, Col. M. I.	Repatriation Dept.
Voevodsky (fnu) Maj. Gen.	Chief, Transportation Div.
Vtiurin, Col. V. V.	Chief, SCC Secretariat
Yeliseyev, Ye. T.	Deputy Political Adviser to SCC Chairman
Yurkin, M. G.	Public Health Dept.
Zfimovich (fnu)	Chief of Machine Construction
Zorin, L. I. Maj. Gen.	Former Chief of Reparations Dept.
Zverov, M. A.	Chief, Finance Div.

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## APPENDIX B

Soviet Personnel Assigned to Administration forSoviet Property in Germany (USIG)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Assignment</u>
Agayev (fnu)	Supply Division
Astashkov (fnu)	Supply Division
Berger (fnu)	Head, Legal Section
Bibenin, M. L.	Reported 5 June, FBIS, as Head, USIG
Chakhanov (fnu)	MVD Division
Donskoy (fnu)	Supply Division
Eremin (fnu)	Technical and Scientific Dept.
Fedortenko (fnu)	formerly Director, SAC-AMO
Fomenko (fnu)	Director, SAC-KABEL
Fomin (fnu)	Commerce Section
Galanov (fnu)	Asst. to Chief, Supply Division
Gromov (fnu)	Supply Division
Izumov (fnu)	Head, Technical and Scientific Dept.
Ivanov (fnu)	Director, SAC-KALI
Kovalov (fnu)	Chief, MVD Division
Krivoshein (fnu)	Deputy Chief, USIG and Chief, Supply Division
Krutkov (fnu)	Asst. to Chief, Supply Division
Kudrow (fnu)	Director, SAC-ZEMENT
Kurashov (fnu)	Supply Division
Kuznetsov (fnu)	Chief, Bookkeeping Dept.

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Assignment</u>
Kyrenkov (fnu)	Commerce Section
Lowschin (fnu)	Director, SAC-ANTONELC
Maklagin (fnu)	Supply Division
Martynov, B. P.	Representative from Moscow
Muraschow (fnu)	Commerce Section
Rodionov (fnu)	Director, SAC-TRANSMASCH
Salmotin, Ivan P.	Chief, Exhibitions Dept.
Salomatin (fnu)	Chief, Economics Dept.
Seizow (fnu)	Commerce Dept.
Senin (fnu)	Supply Division
Silivanov (fnu)	Former Chief, Technical and Scientific Dept.
Sudbinin (fnu)	Director, SAC-BRIKETT
Timoveyow (fnu)	Formerly Chief, Trade Section
Trofimov (fnu)	Head, USIG
Yakovlev (fnu)	Supply Division
Yeromin (fnu)	Representative from Moscow (reported more influential than Chief of USIG)
Yevtoshenko (fnu)	Supply Division
Yevtushenkov (fnu)	Chief, Commerce Dept.
Zamotin (fnu)	Commerce Section
Zarubkin (fnu)	Head of Ramo-Export-Import
Zaytsev (fnu)	Commerce Section

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SAG Administrative Groups

(Date of information November 1951)

<u>Name *</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Major Products</u>	<u>Soviet Director</u>
AMO	19b Magdeburg, Harnackstr. 5	Diesel motors, compressors, armatures, etc.	Rebenin
AVTOWELO	Berlin-Weissensee Berliner Allee 107/110	Business machines, precision instruments, bicycles and passenger cars, clocks and watches, vacuum tubes.	Lowschin
BRIKETT **	Leipzig, Doellnitzerstr. 25	Heavy machinery.	Sudbinin
FOTOPLENKA **	Wolfen Krs. Bitterfeld	Photographic materials.	Unknown
KABEL **	Berlin O 112, Neue Bahnhofstr. 9-11	Machine tools, electrical equipment	Fomenko
KALI	Erfurt, Beethovenplatz	Inorganic chemicals, com- pressed gases, fertilizers, cleaning materials.	Iwanow
KAUSTIK **	19a Bitterfeld	Ammonia and sulphuric acid.	Unknown
KAUTSCHUK **	19a Schkopau ueb. Merseburg	Rubber products.	Unknown
MARTEN	19b Thale <del>f</del> Harz.	Iron and steel making and mining equipment.	Unknown
SYNTHESE	10a Schwarzheide	Synthetic petroleum and coal products.	Unknown

\* ~~WISSEN~~ administration is included by some reporting sources because uranium production is completely under Soviet direction as is the case in all SAC plants. However, supervision is centered in the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow rather than in any SAC organization in East Germany.

\*\* Designations of Soviet supervisory administrative groups seems to vary in difference reports. It is known that some of the SAC organs were abolished when plants were regrouped, but this change does not explain all of the variations reported. There may be some variation in the German and Russian designations.

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SCHIFFFAHRT	2 Frankfurt/Oder	Ship Construction.	Unknown
TRANSMASCH	Leipzig Cl, Waldstr. 82	Engine and railway car construction.	Rodionov
ZEMENT	Berlin-Weissensee Berliner Allee 107/110	Building materials.	Kudrov

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APPENDIX D

Sources

The information exploited in the development of this study of Soviet control agencies in East Germany was derived largely from defector sources. Because of the limited time available for making this study, it was impossible to establish a set of requirements for collection purposes. It became necessary, therefore, to use the information already available within CIA, reserving for a later study, should it be desirable to make one, the full exploitation of the intelligence resources of the Agency.

The information obtained from defector sources was evaluated in <sup>the field.</sup> ~~the field.~~ Unfortunately, much of this information was contradictory and spotty, and in the case of GUSIMZ was limited to 1948. The tightening of Soviet security regulations and the Soviet attitude of regarding data dealing with the economy of East Germany as highly sensitive, particularly information on the collection of reparations, no doubt contributed to the dearth of dependable intelligence.

For the most part the date of the latest information available was limited to the period prior to 1952. Consequently, recent Soviet countermoves to the establishment of the EDO and the signing of the treaty contract with Western Germany have not been included. It would not appear, however,

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that the absence of current information would affect to any great extent the reliability of the organizational structure, but might make the personnel assignments shown in the appendices somewhat out of date. It is believed that with the possible exception of GUSIMZ, the organization and chain of command shown in the charts conforms generally to those which are in existence today.

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Figure 7

(Map of Karlshorst-Berlin)

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